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So how did we get from the days of wine, roses and khachapuri in late 2003 and early 
2004 to where we are today in Georgia? 
Immediately after the crackdown on November 7, 2007, the Western media, in addition 
to the inevitable puns about roses, thorns and withering, offered two different narratives. 
The first, perhaps best seen in Anne Applebaum's piece in The Washington Post, was that 
democracy had failed in Georgia partially because of wrongheaded U.S. policies. The 
second was that this was a mistake, but otherwise things were going well in Georgia and 
if the January 5 elections went well, democracy in Georgia would be back on 
track.  Interestingly, this latter narrative seems to be in the ascendancy and seems to 
reflect US policy. The truth lies somewhere in between and is worth thinking about. 
First, I think that the post-Rose Revolution Government of Georgia has accomplished a 
lot, which some of our speakers have recognized. They have fought corruption in 
government and business. Foreign assistance has actually been used to rebuild Georgia, 
and stopped ending up in individual bank accounts. Laws have been passed to streamline 
business procedures with the hopes of luring more foreign investment. In mid-2004, 
Aslan Abashidze, the criminal leader of Ajara, fled to Russia under pressure from the 
newly revitalized government. Cities, notably Tbilisi and Batumi, have begun to look 
noticeably cleaner, busier and more modern as the economy has slowly improved. These 
are real accomplishments for which the Georgian government deserves credit. And 
they've done in it in the shadow of, shall we say, a very difficult neighbor. 
The Georgian government has argued that they have prioritized state building-not 
democracy-during these years. I think this is an argument made of convenience that 
creates a false dichotomy between these two ideas. A government as popular and 
competent as Saakashvili's in its first few years would only have been made stronger by 
doing things more democratically with a little more attention paid to process.   
Second, I think a great deal of Georgia's strategic import is tied in to its democratic 
development. A failure of democracy in Georgia is a failure for a U.S. and European 
policy that goes far beyond Georgia. If democracy fails in Georgia, it will be hard to 
make the argument that democracy can succeed in any non-democratic country. On the 
other hand, success for democracy in Georgia breathes life into U.S. democracy 
assistance policies and convinces people that the spread of democracy has not come to an 
end. 
I believe there is still hope for democracy in Georgia. Four years of better elections, less 
corruption and a public commitment to democracy by the government are buttressed by 
widespread agreement in Georgia that the future lies with the West-and that means 
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democracy. While these are far from guarantees of success, they do help and should not 
be overlooked. 
But the development of democracy in Georgia has been decidedly mixed since the early 
days of the Rose Revolution. Constitutional amendments were pushed through in 2004, 
concentrating power in the president's hands more than ever before, giving the president 
the right to dissolve parliament and weakening the powers of the legislative branch. 
The judiciary never achieved full independence either, as the government continued to 
dominate it. Additionally, the spirit of democracy was conspicuously absent from the new 
Georgia. Media was less free. The parliament, once a place of lively debate, became 
dominated by the president's party and far less independent. Leaders of the political 
opposition were frequently accused of being parties to Russian plots to destabilize 
Georgia and ridiculed by the president and government for their weakness. 
In 2006, the government manipulated the electoral system for local elections, ensuring 
that the ruling party would dominate local legislatures. Later that year, the government 
again changed the constitution so that the president and parliament would be elected on 
the same day. This was broadly seen as an effort to ensure that the still-popular President 
Saakashvili could provide coattails to the unpopular parliamentary leadership of his party. 
However, the actions of the Georgian government described above only tell a limited part 
of the story. It is also important to look at the actions of Georgia's biggest and most 
important ally, the United States. 
Since the Rose Revolution, the failure of the U.S. government to challenge the erosion of 
Georgian democracy has become increasingly conspicuous and troubling. Additionally, 
democracy assistance in Georgia has changed. Civil society organizations, which might 
have provided a balance to the powerful government, received less money. Instead, 
support went to strengthening the Georgian state-an important goal, but not one that 
helped democracy in Georgia. Georgia is a country that is very pro-American; politicians 
and ordinary people care a lot about what the United States does and says. The U.S. 
policy of praising Georgian accomplishments in other areas but not criticizing the 
increasingly clear shortcomings in the democracy area led the Georgian government to 
believe that they could move further away from democracy without consequences. 
So they did. 
In short, the United States acted as an enabler as Georgian democracy slipped further and 
further away. 
Where then do we go from here, and how can we help Georgian democracy get back on 
track? 
For the future of Georgian democracy, January 6 is more important than January 5. There 
are three possible outcomes to the election, in reverse order of likelihood: an outright win 
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by one of the opposition candidates, a runoff or a first round win by Saakashvili. If it is 
one of the first two, that changes a few things. If Saakashvili does win this election, 
which seems pretty likely, there will be two directions open to him. The first is to tell his 
people and the world that he has now survived a test of popularity, renewed his mandate 
and does not need to brook any opposition or criticism. The second will be to see the 
previous months as a humbling experience and redouble his efforts to move Georgia 
towards a strong and meaningful democracy. I fear that the first is the more likely 
direction, but the role of the United States should be to push Saakashvili towards the 
second direction and to help him move forward accordingly. 
There are five specific ways that the United States can do this: 
Support institutions, not individuals: Saakashvili's outsized personality has made it very 
hard to separate Georgia's democratic aspirations from those of its leader. His intellect, 
humor, passion, courage and language skills were particularly appealing in the United 
States, where they were reinforced by a familiarity with American culture and 
contributed to a strong personal bond between the presidents of the two countries. This 
bond was solidified during Bush's 2005 visit to Georgia, where the two presidents feasted 
on Georgian food late into the night and Bush briefly went on stage to join the dancers 
who had come to entertain the party. Democracy rarely evolves simply because a 
democrat gets elected, yet U.S. policy in Georgia seemed to reflect this approach. 
American assistance in Georgia should instead refocus on supporting the democratic 
development of institutions inside and outside the state, including government 
departments, local and national legislatures, civil society and political parties. 
Reinvigorate civil society: Since the Rose Revolution, civil society has been considerably 
weaker than under the previous regime. This is partially because a number of civil society 
leaders have moved into the government or parliament, and partially because there are 
more jobs in the private sector than before, but it is also substantially due to the United 
States reorienting its democracy assistance support in Georgia. By reducing support to 
civil society organizations, Washington has contributed to the withering of a key 
component of democracy. Stronger civil society organizations could have helped to 
provide a check on the government, something parliament is not constitutionally able to 
do and which the increasingly less independent and critical media has been unable to do 
since the Rose Revolution. Because of the weakened civil society, each time democracy 
was cut a little bit, there was little cohesive and visible response. If the U.S. government 
does nothing else in Georgia, they should substantially increase support for civil society 
there. 
Distinguish between reform and democratizing: Georgia's government has succeeded in 
passing a broad array of reform legislation. They have reduced bureaucratic hurdles for 
those seeking to open a business, improved Georgia's business climate, made rational and 
necessary budget decisions, invested in the country's infrastructure and generally 
improved the quality of governance. This is not, however, the same as strengthening 
democracy. Moreover, the way in which many of these reforms have occurred-with 
limited dialogue, parliamentary debate and public input-has contributed to growing 
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resentment of the government among Georgians. Strengthening democracy means 
increasing participation and accountability in all phases of governance and allowing for 
free elections at the legislative and policymaking levels. It does not simply mean passing 
reform legislation that is westward looking and improving the business climate. The 
United States should continue to support and applaud the reforms which the Georgian 
government has undertaken, but this must evaluated separately from the question of the 
direction and development of Georgia's democracy. 
Don't overpromise: This is a basic rule of politics at all levels, but one which both the 
Georgian and Americans broke with regards to democracy in Georgia. Saakashvili's 
weakness for overblown rhetoric has caused him to overstate his accomplishments and 
consistently make unrealistic promises. Saakashvili has delivered the best democracy in 
the region, but has promised his people Plato's Republic on the Black Sea. The gap 
between the expectations to which this rhetoric contributed and the reality of life in 
Saakashvili's Georgia for ordinary people was a major factor contributing to the size and 
vehemence of the demonstrations in early November. Similarly, the rhetoric and actions 
of the United States overstated the degree of the democratic changes in Georgia. 
Don't get spun: The United States should be more rigorous in evaluating the development 
of Georgia's democracy. Verbal commitments to democracy by the government, no 
matter how eloquent and how good the English, should not obscure problems with 
Georgian democracy. Unfortunately, this has been the case in recent years. The Georgian 
government is exceptionally good at presenting itself both at the individual level and 
through the media. As a result, things like a well articulated speech in the United States 
by Saakashvili or a western media campaign have taken on far more significance than 
they should. In the future, Washington should base its democracy policy in Georgia on 
the actual state of democracy there, not just the words of its leadership. For example, 
Saakashvili's recent comments that "I do not want to be the president of a country that 
limits mass media and that declares emergency rule" or that "I would like everyone to 
know that each baton hit on our citizens was also a hit on me and the tear-gas that the 
police used made me cry as well" should not be taken as evidence of Saakashvili's 
contrition. 
Lastly, the big winner in recent weeks in Georgia has been Vladimir Putin. The visible 
shortcomings of democracy and chaos in Georgia are exactly what the Russians would 
like to see there. There is little doubt that many in Russia would like to see Saakashvili 
fail. This does not, however, mean that domestic opponents of Saakashvili are somehow 
Russian operatives. Some may be, but clearly most are not. The evidence used by the 
Georgian government has been, in many cases, quite flimsy. The reality of the Russian 
threat should not be used to excuse democratic shortcomings. Success of genuine 
democracy in Georgia is the most powerful message Saakashvili and Georgia can send to 
their northern neighbor and we need to help them do that. 
Lincoln Mitchell is the Arnold A. Saltzman Assistant Professor in the Practice of 
International Politics at Columbia University. 
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